In Swe den there is an on go ing de bate concern ing the high cost for phar ma ceu ti cals. Ex pen di tures on phar ma ceu ti cals have risen on av er age 10 per year dur ing the past 25 years, and in 2002 the cost reached 31.7 bil lion Swedish crowns: pre scrip tion pharma ceu ti cals 24.5 bil lion, hos pi tal phar maceu ti cals 2.7 and over-the-coun ter phar maceu ti cals 4.5 bil lion. This trend in Swe den par al lels that in many oth er Eu ro pean countries, spurring in ter est in var i ous meth ods for con tain ing phar ma ceu ti cal costs (see e.g., [2, 6] ). In the mar ket for phar ma ceu ticals cost con tain ing mea sures op er ate both on the phar ma ceu ti cal in dus try, for ex ample, price con trols and ref er ence prices, and on the de mand side, for ex am ple, pay ment sys tems for physi cians and phar ma cists, pos i tive or neg a tive lists sug gest ing which phar ma ceu ti cals physi cians should prescribe, ge ner ic sub sti tu tion re quire ments, and pa tient co pay ment plans.
Dur ing the pe ri od un der study here the most wide ly used form of cost con tain ment in Swe den was pa tient co pay ments. The Swedish phar ma ceu ti cal in sur ance sys tem is non lin ear, mak ing pa tient co pay ments de crease as to tal ex pen di ture for phar maceu ti cals in crease. All costs for the pa tient ex ceed ing 1,800 Swedish crowns per year are fi nanced through the Swedish phar maceu ti cals in sur ance sys tem. An oth er well known cost con tain ment mea sure is the socalled ref er ence price sys tem which was intro duced in Swe den in 1993. The ref er ence price sys tem stat ed that all costs above a pre de ter mined ref er ence price must be borne by the pa tient. Sim i lar sys tems have been in tro duced in The Nether lands, Fin land, Nor way, and Ger many, among oth ers. The Swedish sys tem spec i fied that any costs ex ceed ing by more 10 the price of the least ex pen sive ge ner ic sub sti tute are to be borne by the pa tient. On 1 Oc tober 2002 the ref er ence price sys tem in Sweden was abol ished. In its place a law was intro duced, re quir ing phar ma cists to sub stitute the pre scribed phar ma ceu ti cal to the cheap est equiv a lent phar ma ceu ti cal product avail able at the lo cal phar ma cy [10] .
Phar ma ceu ti cals have oc ca sion al ly been ex clud ed from the Swedish phar maceu ti cal re im burse ment plan. In the dataset used in this study ap prox. 2.2 per cent of the pre scrip tions were re lat ed to pharma ceu ti cals ex clud ed from the re im bursement plan. An oth er pos si ble cost con tainment mea sure is to re strict the num ber of di ag noses for which a phar ma ceu ti cal prod uct can be pre scribed. This, how ev er, has been seen by pol i cy mak ers as too restric tive of phy si cian au ton o my, a con cept cen tral in med i cine [2] . Also, un der the Swedish phar ma ceu ti cal in sur ance sys tem there are usu al ly no for mal re stric tions on phy si cian pre scrip tion be hav ior or pe cuniary in cen tives for the phy si cian to share the in sur ers' util i ty.
Since 1998 the coun ty coun cils in Sweden have been re spon si ble for the costs of pre scrip tion phar ma ceu ti cals not paid by the pa tient. It is thus in the in ter est of the coun ty coun cil to con tain phar ma ceuti cal costs. In spite of this health cen ters in Väster bot ten Coun ty, which are the main source of phar ma ceu ti cal pre scrip tions made in the re gion, usu al ly work with open-end ed bud gets for phar ma ceu ti cal ex pen di ture, mean ing that the pre scrib ing agen cy has lit tle in cen tive to con tain costs.
The pur pose of this study was to ex amine the ef fects of an at tempt by the lo cal coun ty coun cil to in tro duce "hard" budget con straints in phar ma ceu ti cal bud gets in two of the health cen ters in Väster botten, Swe den. In 2001 these two health centers were giv en fixed bud gets for phar maceu ti cal ex pen di tures, giv ing them an incen tive to de crease ex pen di tures as they were al lowed to keep any sur plus (and being forced to re pay any def i cit) gen er at ed dur ing the year.
Whether the in tro duc tion of fixed budgets ac tu al ly helps to con tain costs in public agen cies is, how ev er, un known. On the one hand, fixed bud get con straints are often con sid ered a nec es sary con di tion for the bud getary pro cess to be ef fec tive. On the oth er hand, fixed bud get con straints are sel dom seen as suf fi cient cost-con taining mea sures in pub lic agen cies. One problem is that fixed bud gets must be cred i ble.
The prin ci pal may be tempt ed to ad just budgets ac cord ing to his to ry, cre at ing an in centive to over spend to pre clude bud get cuts in the fu ture, the so-called ratch et ef fect (for a dis cus sion of soft bud get con straints see [4] ). An oth er prob lem is that lack of in for ma tion may lead to the in tro duc tion of more or less fuzzy con tracts, mak ing incen tives un clear (for a dis cus sion of prob-crease the cen ters' au ton o my. A fixed budget is de fined as one de ter mined on the basis of char ac ter is tics ex og e nous to the de cisions made by the health cen ter it self, and where sur plus es and deficits car ry over to the next year's bud get. The health cen ters can spend sur plus es on, for ex am ple, bonus wages or in vest ments in the work en viron ment. Ac cord ing ly, the health cen ters and their staffs can ben e fit from the in troduc tion of fixed bud gets if they are able to book a sur plus. The coun ty coun cil can also ben e fit from the re form if the pharma ceu ti cal bud get for a health cen ter is re duced by in tro duc ing the fixed bud get. How ev er, a third pos si bil i ty is that the fixed bud get does not help to con tain cost, pos si bly be cause of lack of cred i bil i ty, making no one bet ter off af ter the in tro duc tion of fixed phar ma ceu ti cal bud gets.
There are sev er al ways in which the intro duc tion of fixed bud gets may af fect prescrip tion be hav ior in health cen ters. First, the num ber of pre scrip tions may be decreased. Hav ing a fixed bud get could mean that physi cians are more re luc tant to write pre scrip tions at giv en prices and quan ti ties. Sec ond, since mar gin al co payment de creas es with the to tal pur chase of phar ma ceu ti cals dur ing a full year, physicians can "choose" to change the mix of pa tients who ob tain pre scrip tion phar maceu ti cals. To sub sti tute pa tients a phy sician must have in for ma tion re gard ing the po si tion of the pa tient in the price schedule. Such in for ma tion was not avail able for the pre scrib ing physi cians dur ing the pe riod of our study. Third, the price of phar maceu ti cals for a giv en treat ment can be decreased, for ex am ple, by an in creased use of ge ner ic phar ma ceu ti cals. The avail abil ity of in for ma tion re gard ing the price of differ ent phar ma ceu ti cals in creased for the pre scrib ing physi cians dur ing the pe ri od un der study. Fi nal ly, pre scrip tions can be made to re duce the num ber of de fined daily dos es (DDDs) per pre scrip tion. A well known prob lem with pre scrip tion phar maceu ti cals is that large quan ti ties are wast ed, in di cat ing that over pre scrip tion is a ma jor prob lem. How ev er, if the num ber of doses is re duced, the pa tient is more like ly to re turn to the health cen ter for a new prescrip tion, which may in crease costs. The pres ent study ad dressed the lat ter two possi bil i ties, i.e., whether the in tro duc tion of mea sures have been used, which might make fur ther cost re duc tions dif fi cult.
Back ground and hy pothe ses to be ex plored
Since 1998 the coun ty coun cils in Swe den have been re spon si ble for the costs of prescrip tion phar ma ceu ti cals not paid by the pa tient. For Väster bot ten Coun ty Coun cil, these costs are ap prox. 500 mil lion Swedish crowns per year. The coun ty coun cils are to some ex tent re im bursed by the central gov ern ment through the Swedish Nation al In sur ance Board (SNIB). Ac cording to the agree ment be tween Väster botten Coun ty Coun cil and the SNIB, the SNIB will pay a to tal of 1.5 bil lion crowns for phar ma ceu ti cal in sur ance costs in the coun ty dur ing the years 2000-2004. This means that ap prox. 375 mil lion crowns per year are paid by the SNIB, while all ad dition al costs for phar ma ceu ti cal in sur ance is paid by Väster bot ten Coun ty Coun cil.
Health cen ters pro vide out pa tient treatment and are the most lo cal pro duc ers of health care in Swe den. Res i dents of Väster-bot ten can choose to en roll them selves at any health cen ter in the coun ty and are, if they do not make an ac tive choice, enrolled based on res i dence. How ev er, patients are free to vis it any health cen ter of their choice when sick, ir re spec tive of where they are for mal ly en rolled. Only a small pro por tion of the pre scrip tions in the pres ent dataset from any giv en health cen ter are for pa tients en rolled else where, in di cat ing that there is lit tle ex change of pa tients be tween health cen ters.
Since 2001 health cen ters in Väster botten have born bud getary re spon si bil i ty for phar ma ceu ti cal costs. The coun ty coun cil works with tar get bud gets for the health cen ters that are de cid ed part ly on the ba sis of char ac ter is tics of the pa tients en rolled at the health cen ter (pri ma ry age and gen der) and part ly on each health cen ter's re sult in 2001. How ev er, bud gets are not fixed in the sense that sur plus es or deficits are car ried over to the next year's bud get. This means that the eco nom ic in cen tives to re duce phar ma ceu ti cal costs are lim it ed.
Start ing in 2001 two health cen ters locat ed in Väster bot ten (those of Burträsk and Moröbacke) ob tained fixed bud gets as a part of an agree ment in tend ed to inlems as so ci at ed with op ti mal in cen tive con tracts see [7] ). Thus the ef fi ca cy of intro duc ing fixed bud get con straints on cost con tain ment is an em pir i cal ques tion.
The ef fect of in tro duc ing fixed bud get con straints on phar ma ceu ti cals costs was in ves ti gat ed by Wheynes et al. [12] us ing cross-sec tion al data from one health author i ty in the Unit ed King dom. Per forming a re gres sion on the net in gre di ent cost of phar ma ceu ti cals pre scribed by each gener al prac ti tio ner in the area and con trol ling for five con found ing fac tors, they found sup port for the hy poth e sis that fixed budgets re duces phar ma ceu ti cal costs.
The pres ent study com pares phar maceu ti cal ex pen di tures at health cen ters with fixed phar ma ceu ti cal bud gets to those with open-end ed bud gets. Hav ing ac cess to data from both be fore and af ter the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets al lows us to com pare the rel a tive chang es in pharma ceu ti cal costs. This is im por tant since health cen ters which choose to use a fixed bud get may have low er ini tial pharma ceu ti cal costs. Chang es in the ex pen ditures on phar ma ceu ti cals were dif fer enti at ed into: the num ber of pre scrip tions, the size of pre scrip tions (the num ber of de fined dai ly dos es per pre scrip tion), and the price of the phar ma ceu ti cal. Pre scriptions were matched ac cord ing to a wide range of back ground vari ables, in clud ing age and di ag no sis, us ing the meth od of propen si ty score match ing. This makes it pos si ble to study whether physi cians re spond to the bud getary rules by prescrib ing cheap er phar ma ceu ti cals or fewer dos es of phar ma ceu ti cals per pre scription. Fi nal ly, the num bers of pre scrip tions in health cen ters with fixed bud gets are com pared to those in cen ters with openend ed bud gets.
The re sults show that the num ber of pre scrip tions in the two health cen ters with fixed bud gets de clined rel a tive to the con trol group af ter the in tro duc tion of the fixed bud gets. How ev er, there is no system at ic dif fer ence re gard ing ei ther price or quan ti ty per pre scrip tion be tween the two types of health cen ters. One pos si ble ex pla na tion is that the pre scrib ing physicians do not be lieve the fixed bud gets to be cred i ble. In ad di tion, both health centers with fixed bud gets are lo cat ed in a region where sev er al oth er cost con tain ment a fixed bud get de creas es prices for phar maceu ti cals with in spe cif ic ATC groups, and whether the num ber of dos es per pre scription is af fect ed. We also in clud ed some tenta tive in for ma tion on the num ber of prescrip tions per list ed pa tient made out at the dif fer ent health cen ters.
To study the price and quan ti ty ef fects the two health cen ters with fixed bud gets (the treat ment group) were com pared to a group of health cen ters that have tar get bud gets (the com par i son group). Since prescrip tion be hav ior can dif fer be fore the intro duc tion of fixed bud gets, a time di mension was also in clud ed. A dif fer ence-in-differ ence meth od was used to study price and quan ti ty ef fects. If fixed bud gets have the intend ed ef fects, we ex pect the prices and/or num ber of DDDs to drop in the treat ment group rel a tive to the com par i son group, after the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets.
On 1 Oc to ber 2002 the so-called sub stitu tion re form was in tro duced, re quir ing phar ma cists to sub sti tute the pre scribed phar ma ceu ti cal to the cheap est equiv a lent phar ma ceu ti cal prod uct avail able at the local phar ma cy. (Pri or to the re form the prescrib ing phy si cian's ac tive ap proval was required for such a sub sti tu tion; Apoteket AB, Land st ings för bun det, Läkemedels för-mån snäm n den 2004; Ut byte av läkeme-del-en uppföljn ing av de förs ta 15 må naderna med läkemedel sre for men) This re form has had a large ef fect on phar ma ceu ti cal costs, par tic u lar ly prices, at health cen ters [11] . The sub sti tu tion re form of fers an oth er pos si bil i ty to test our hy pothe ses. Since the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets in 2001 prices and quan ti ties should have dropped in the health cen ters with fixed bud gets be fore the in tro duc tion of the sub sti tu tion re form. There fore, mak ing a sim i lar com par i son before and af ter the in tro duc tion of the sub stitu tion re form, we would ex pect a price decrease in the com par i son group rel a tive to the group of "treat ed" health cen ters.
Our main hy pothe ses are thus: (a) compar ing the pe ri od of Jan uary-Septem ber 2002, when fixed bud gets are new ly intro duced, with the pre re form pe ri od, we ex pect prices and quan ti ties in treat ed health cen ters to fall rel a tive ly to the compar isons, and (b) for the pe ri od af ter the in tro duc tion of the sub sti tu tion re form we ex pect the rel a tive price dif fer ence to be pos i tive. A po ten tial prob lem with the da-Fixed bud gets as a cost con tain ment mea sure for phar ma ceu ti cals
Ab stract
In Väster bot ten Coun ty, Swe den, there are two health cen ters which (in con trast to all oth er health cen ters in the re gion) bear strict re spon si bil i ty over their phar ma ceuti cal bud get. This study ex am ined whether the prices and quan ti ties of phar ma ceu ti cals pre scribed by physi cians work ing at these health cen ters dif fer sig nif i cant ly from those pre scribed by physi cians at health centers with open-end ed bud gets. Es ti ma tion re sults us ing match ing meth ods, which allows us to com pare sim i lar pa tients at the dif fer ent health cen ters, show that the in troduc tion of fixed phar ma ceu ti cal bud gets did not af fect physi cians' pre scrip tion be havior, in di cat ing that fixed bud gets may not be an ef fi cient mea sure to re duce costs. Anoth er ex pla na tion is that the health cen ters un der study al ready had tak en mea sures to con tain costs, mak ing it hard to fur ther reduce costs.
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Fixed bud gets · Phar ma ceu ti cals · Cost con tain ment · Propen si ty score match ing ta is that the year 2001, which forms the basis for our first com par i son, was an ad justment pe ri od for the health cen ters where fixed bud gets are to be in tro duced. This means that the treat ed health cen ters may have act ed so as to in crease their fu ture bud gets. To as sess whether such be hav ior may have in flu enced our data we also compared post-and pre re form pe ri ods to the year 2001. The dif fer ent time pe ri ods under study are il lus trat ed in . Fig. 1 .
The em pir i cal anal y sis

Data
The data used in this study were pro vided by Väster bot ten Coun ty Coun cil, Sweden. The dataset con tains a to tal of 6.2 million ob ser va tions, cov er ing all phar ma ceuti cals sold in the coun ty of Väster bot ten or sold in oth er parts of Swe den to res i dents of Väster bot ten be tween Jan uary 2001 and June 2003. Due to com put er lim i ta tions a ran dom sam ple of 25 are drawn from this pop u la tion.
The coun ty of Väster bot ten (pop u la tion 255,122, June 2003) con sists of 15 ad min istra tive ar eas. The two health cen ters Burträsk and Moröbacke, both lo cat ed in the ad min is tra tive area of Skelleft eå, re ceived fixed bud gets for pre scrip tion phar ma ceu ticals on 1 May 2001 and 1 Novem ber 2001, respec tive ly. Since these were the two health cen ters of in ter est in this anal y sis, and since we want ed to avoid po ten tial dif fer ences be tween the ar eas in flu enc ing the re sults, all ob ser va tions not orig i nat ing from physicians work ing at health cen ters in Skelleft eå are ex clud ed. We also ex clud ed near ly 6 of the ob ser va tions with mis sing data on the phy si cian's work place. In ad di tion, al most 6 of the ob ser va tions were dropped since the cost per DDD can not be cal cu lat ed, or be cause they in di cate re sell of the phar maceu ti cal prod uct to the phar ma cy. The fi nal sam ple to be used in the em pir i cal anal y sis con sists of 292,419 ob ser va tions.
The dataset in cludes in for ma tion re garding the pa tient's age, gen der, and area of resi dence. Pa tients are, how ev er, not trace able over time. The in for ma tion about the prescrip tion con tains the month in which it is sold, the ATC code, and an in di ca tor of whether it was packed in "pa tient doses" rather than their or di nary pack ages.
Pa tients who have rel a tive ly sta ble med ica tion and can be ex pect ed to ex pe ri ence some prob lem in keep ing track of the size of dos es which they should take of ten receive their pre scrip tions in such "pa tient dos es. " In ad di tion, the dataset in cludes in for ma tion about the cost of the pre scription and the pa tient's co-pay ment for the pre scrip tion. Us ing these vari ables and infor ma tion about the dif fer ent phas es in the re im burse ment sys tem, we cal cu lat ed the co-pa tient brack et in which the pa tient was pri or to pay ing for the cur rent pre scrip tion. The cal cu la tions are omit ted here due to lim i ta tions of space but are avail able from the au thors upon re quest. The dum my variables Co pay100, Co pay50, Co pay25, Copay10, and Co pay0 were de fined to cor respond to mar gin al rates of co pay ment of 100, 50, 25, 10, and 0, re spec tive ly. Some pre scrip tions are al ways free of charge for the pa tient and oth ers are ex clud ed from the re im burse ment plan (e.g., cough med i cine) ir re spec tive of the pa tient's copay ment brack et. For these ob ser va tions the pa tients' co pay ment rates pro vide no in for ma tion of pre vi ous cost for pre scription phar ma ceu ti cals. The dum my variables Free and Un sub, re spec tive ly, in dicate that a pre scrip tion was free of charge and un sub si dized, re spec tive ly.
De scrip tive sta tis tics by health cen ters are pre sent ed in . Ta ble 1. For the dif ferent in di ca tor vari ables the per cent age of the ma te ri al which be longs to each cat ego ry are pre sent ed; for con tin u ous variables the means and stan dard de vi a tions are pre sent ed. The data con tain 146 fourdig it ATC groups. Of these groups 52 have few er than 100 ob ser va tions, 39 have be tween 100 and 1,000, and 55 have more than 1,000 ob ser va tions. The ob ser vations are very even ly dis tribut ed over the 30 months of the study, with the fewest phar ma ceu ti cals (7, 830) 
De scrip tive sta tis tics of the key variables from be fore and af ter the in tro duction of fixed bud get con straints are present ed in . Ta ble 2. The Price/DDD and the num ber of DDDs/pre scrip tion are seen here to have de clined in Burträsk after fixed bud gets were in tro duced, but the con trary was the case in Moröbacke. The num ber of pre scrip tions per month and pa tient en rolled at each health cen ter decreased both in Burträsk and Moröbacke rel a tive to the con trol groups. For the overall sam ple the av er age cost per DDD was 6.5 crowns, the av er age num ber of DDDs per pre scrip tion 41.7, and the av er age cost per pre scrip tion 163 crowns.
Econo met ric meth od
To test whether the av er age price per DDD or the av er age num ber of DDDs per prescrip tion are af fect ed by the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets we es ti mat ed the av er age treat ment ef fect on those treat ed for these two out come vari ables. "Treat ed" in this case means that the pre scrip tion was written by a phy si cian work ing at a health center with a fixed phar ma ceu ti cal bud get.
This study used a vari ant of propen si ty score match ing in which un treat ed ob ser vations are de ter mined to be suit able matches for treat ed ob ser va tions if they have simi lar prob a bil i ty of be ing treat ed. Rosenbaum and Ru bin [8] dem on stra ted that if the fol low ing three con di tions are sat isfied, then the out come is in de pen dent of treat ment as sign ment con di tioned on the propen si ty score, Pr(D=1|X), and the bias is 0. Here D is a dum my which takes the val ue 1 if the ob ser va tion ac tu al ly is treated, and X is a set of ob serv able vari ables. The first con di tion is that all rel e vant differ ences be tween the groups must be captured by the ob serv ables. The sec ond condi tion states that the match ing must be carried out over a re gion in which the prob abil i ty of be ing treat ed con di tioned on X is be tween 0 and 1, that is: 0<Pr(D=1|X)<1. How ev er, as shown by Smith and Todd (unpub lished), the con di tion 0<Pr(D=1|X) is not re quired when the pa ram e ter of in terest is the av er age treat ment ef fect on the treat ed since it guar an tees good match es only for each un treat ed ob ser va tion. The final con di tion is that the ob serv ables must be in de pen dent of treat ment as sign ment con di tioned on the propen si ty score.
By us ing both pre-and post treat ment data we avoid hav ing to ful fill the first con dition. We do this by us ing a dif fer ence-in-differ ence ex ten sion of propen si ty score matching which takes ac count of time-in vari ant un ob serv able het ero ge ne ity. This meth od pro vides an un bi ased es ti mate of the treatment ef fect on the treat ed even if un ob servable dif fer ences ex ist be tween Burträsk and Moröbacke and oth er health cen ters as long as these dif fer ences are time in vari ant. We es ti mat ed the dif fer ences be tween the treated-con trol out come dif fer ences af ter treatment and the treat ed-con trol out come differ ences be fore treat ment, that is:
where Y 1 is the out come if an ob ser va tion was treat ed, and Y 0 was the po ten tial outcome if the ob ser va tion had not been treated. An apos tro phe in di cates that the pe riod be fore treat ment and D' is a dum my which takes the val ue 1 for ob ser va tions orig i nat ing from Burträsk or Moröbacke be fore they re ceived fixed bud gets for prescrip tion phar ma ceu ti cal. The ef fect was es ti mat ed sep a rate ly for Burträsk and Moröbacke since they re ceived fixed phar maceu ti cal bud gets at dif fer ent times.
Match ing meth ods dif fer by plac ing dif fer ent weights on the con trol ob ser va- tions. Near est neigh bor match ing, which was used here, puts all weight on the ob serva tion in the non treat ed group which has the most sim i lar propen si ty score. This re duces bias since only the best matches are used, but it may in crease vari ance com pared to the oth er match ing meth ods which uses more ob ser va tions from the con trol group. We im posed a com mon sup port con di tion by spec i fy ing that the max i mum al lowed dis tance be tween the propen si ty score of the treat ed and the control is 0.01. Treat ed ob ser va tions for which no match es could be found in this range were ex clud ed from the anal y sis.
Es ti ma tion of propen si ty score
The first step in es ti mat ing the dif fer ence in dif fer ence is to es ti mate the propen si ty scores be fore and af ter treat ment. To obtain ro bust es ti mates we used vari ables that af fect treat ment as well as vari ables which af fect the out come when es ti mating the propen si ty score. We in clud ed gender us ing an in di ca tor vari able equal ing 1 if the sub ject was a wom an, and age by using in di ca tor vari ables for each 5-year age group. We also in clud ed a dum my variable, de not ed here as Area, which took the val ue 1 if the pa tient resid ed in some area oth er than Skelleft eå and in clud ed in di cator vari ables for the month in which the phar ma ceu ti cal was sold. As shown in . Ta ble 1, the pro por tion of pre scrip tions in pa tient-dos es dif fered between health cen ters. Coscel li [1] showed that pa tients ex hib it strong state de pendence, that is, they pre fer to re ceive phar maceu ti cals that they have al ready re ceived in the past. This gives the usu al ly more ex pensive brand-name phar ma ceu ti cals a first mov er ad van tage. State de pen dence is proba bly more im por tant among the pa tients receiv ing their pre scrip tions in pa tient dos es since these pa tients usu al ly have rel a tive ly sta ble med i ca tion. We there fore in clud ed a dum my vari able, re ferred to here as Dos es, which took the val ue 1 if the pre scrip tion is made out in pa tient dos es.
Pre vi ous stud ies have shown that the patient's co pay ment is like ly to af fect the prescrip tion be ing made [5, 9] . We in clud ed the dum my vari ables Co pay, Un sub, and Free to take ac count of this ef fect. We use the pa tient's co pay ment brack et pri or to receiv ing the pre scrip tion in ques tion to avoid the en do gene ity prob lem of co pay ment be ing af fect ed by the price and vol ume of the phar ma ceu ti cal be ing pre scribed.
An oth er vari able which is im por tant to in clude is the phar ma ceu ti cal's four-dig it ATC group. The ATC group af fects treatment as the health cen ters em ploy physicians with dif fer ent spe cial ties and af fects out come since av er age price per DDD and num ber of DDDs per pre scrip tion vary con sid er ably be tween ATC groups. We view ATC group as a pre de ter mined health in di ca tor which is a func tion of the pa tient's health sta tus and there fore ex oge nous to treat ment. The same ar gu ment goes for Dos es, Un sub, and Free.
Among a gen er al set of mod els, all of the vari ables dis cussed above but in cluding var i ous in ter ac tion terms, the fi nal spec i fi ca tions were cho sen to max i mize the with in-sam ple cor rect pre dic tion rates us ing the hit-or-miss meth od (e.g., [3] ). This meth od as signs ob ser va tions the value of 1 if the es ti mat ed propen si ty score is larg er than the por tion of the sam ple which is treat ed and the val ue of 0 oth erwise. The propen si ty scores were cal cu lated us ing log it es ti ma tions of dif fer ent versions of the fol low ing equa tion:
Ta ble 2
De scrip tive sta tis tics for the treat ment and con trol groups. Con trols con sist of all ob ser va tions orig i nat ing from health cen ters in Skelleft eå oth er than Burträsk and Moröbacke be fore and af ter the re spec tive health cen ter re ceived fixed bud get con straints; prices in Swedish crowns Es ti ma tion re sults of the rel a tive chang es be tween the pe ri ods Jan uary- where Treat equals 1 if the pre scrip tion is from a phy si cian at Burträsk or Moröba-cke, and A, M, and D in di cate the number of age groups, months, and four-dig it ATC groups in each sub sam ple. The re sults from the log it es ti ma tions (avail able from the au thors upon re quest) show that all mod els are sig nif i cant at the P<0.0001 lev el on the ba sis of cal cu la tions us ing the F sta tis tic. The with in-sam ple cor rect pre dic tion rate ranged be tween 56 and 62 for Burträsk and be tween 58 and 65 for. The cor re spond ing figures for the pseu do-R 2 val ues were 0.02-0.06 and 0.02-0.09, re spec tive ly.
Two bal anc ing tests pre sent ed in Appen dix 1 show that we were able to bal ance most sub sam ples by match ing on propensi ty score. How ev er, for all mod els some vari ables re main un bal anced.
Match ing re sults
As dis cussed above, we ex pect the dif ference-in-dif fer ence es ti mates to vary over time. We there fore di vid ed the data into sub pe ri ods to test the hy poth e sis that prices and quan ti ties are af fect ed by the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets. Three posttreat ment pe ri ods were iden ti fied (see . Fig. 1) . First, for the pe ri od from 2002 the treat ed health cen ters had an in cen tive to de crease prices and quan ti ties through the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets. Howev er, on 1 Oc to ber 2002 the sub sti tu tion re form was in tro duced, which may have had a large im pact on health cen ters which pre scribed rel a tive ly ex pen sive phar ma ceu ti cals. If fixed bud gets had an im pact on prices and quan ti ties, we would most like ly find a dif fer ence in prices and quan ti ties for the pe ri od up to the sub stitu tion re form. There fore the first com pari son is made be tween the pe ri od Jan uary pri or to the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets. Sec ond, af ter 1 Oc to ber 2002, when the sub sti tu tion re form was en act ed, we expect the prices in the com par i son group to have been af fect ed more strong ly than those in the treat ed health cen ters, since if fixed bud gets had the hy poth e sized effects, prices should al ready have ad just ed in the treat ed health cen ters. Third, the fixed phar ma ceu ti cal bud gets are in part de ter mined by out comes in 2001, which gives the treat ed health cen ters an in centive to over spend in 2001 in or der to increase their fu ture bud gets. We there fore com pare the pe ri od 2001 af ter the for mal in tro duc tion of the new rules with the pe riod 2001 pri or to the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets (Jan uary-April for Burträsk and Jan uary-Oc to ber for Moröbacke) to ex amine whether this in cen tive led to chang es in pre scrip tion be hav ior.
Of the pre scrip tions by physi cians at Burträsk and Moröbacke, 2.7 and 4.9, re spec tive ly, were made out to pa tients not en rolled at the re spec tive health cen ters, which means that they did not bear the costs of these pre scrip tions. Nei ther were the health cen ters bud gets charged for the 0.6 of ob ser va tions re fer ring to spe cial phar ma ceu ti cals. The re sults were not affect ed by drop ping these ob ser va tions and the ob ser va tions which re fer to un sub sidized phar ma ceu ti cals. The re sults are also ro bust against chang es in the spec i fi cation of the se lec tion mod els. To in ves ti gate whether the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets or the sub sti tu tion re form had dif fer ent ef fects on dif fer ent phar ma ceu ti cal treatments we also dis tin guished be tween ATC groups. The three groups cho sen are A, C, and N, which re fer to phar ma ceu ti cals relat ed to di ges tive or gans and me tab o lism, heart and cir cu la tion, and the ner vous system, re spec tive ly. The groups con sti tute approx. 12, 24, and 28 of the pre scriptions, re spec tive ly.
. Ta ble 3 pre sents the av er age treatment ef fect for the pe ri od Jan uary-September 2000. Our first hy poth e sis pre dict ed that both prices and quan ti ties would decrease rel a tive ly to the com par i son group. How ev er, the es ti mat ed quan ti ty dif ference for Moröbacke was pos i tive and signif i cant when com par ing all ATC groups, and there was a large vari a tion in the es timat ed quan ti ty dif fer ences be tween ATC groups. For Burträsk one notes that the price dif fer ence is pos i tive and sig nif i cant in ATC group N; the oth er es ti mat ed differ ences dif fer in size as well as sign. To test the sec ond hy pothe ses we took the differ ences be tween the pe ri od from September 2002 and that of Jan uary-Septem ber 2002. The re sults are pre sent ed in . Table 4. Burträsk and Moröbacke had lowered the num ber of DDDs/pre scrip tion after the sub sti tu tion re form rel a tive ly to the con trol group, but prices per DDD were hard ly af fect ed. This is sur pris ing since the re form was aimed at af fect ing price per DDD, not the num ber of DDDs.
As not ed above, a po ten tial prob lem in test ing our first hy pothe ses is that prices and quan ti ties in 2001 could have been affect ed by an at tempt of the treat ed health cen ters to in crease their fu ture bud gets. An in crease in prices and quan ti ties rel a tive to the com par i son group, when com par ing the post-and pre re form pe ri ods in 2001 would in di cate that such be hav ior might have in flu enced our data. The re sults present ed in . Ta ble 5 show that quan ti ties were sig nif i cant ly high er in Moröbacke in all the ATC groups, and that there was also a gen er al ten den cy to pos i tive ef fects in the in di vid u al ATC groups. For Burträ-sk the quan ti ty dif fer ences were gen er al ly neg a tive, al though sta tis ti cal ly non signif icant. There was no sys tem at ic dif fer ence in prices be tween the groups. Again, signif i cant re sults were found in ATC group N. Al though the re sults for quan ti ties in Moröbacke bear the ex pect ed sign, no system at ic dif fer ence in pre scrip tion be havior is ob served be tween post-and pre reform pe ri ods for 2001. How ev er, this is a weak test of strate gic be hav ior since such be hav ior may have be gun be fore the formal in tro duc tion of the new rules. If the re sults for the first hy poth e sis were af fected by strate gic be hav ior, this would lead to an over es ti ma tion of po ten tial re ductions in prices and quan ti ties due to the in tro duc tion of fixed phar ma ceu ti cal budgets. To con clude, in de pen dent ly of compar i son, only a few of the es ti mat ed ef fects proved to fa vor our hy pothe ses. Most of the es ti mates did not dif fer sig nif i cant ly from 0. Sta tis ti cal ly sig nif i cant es ti mates were con trary to ex pec ta tions. Thus the data pro vide no sup port for the hy poth esis that fixed bud gets af fect phy si cian prescrip tion be hav ior.
Dis cus sion
Ten ta tive re sults from this study show that when the two health cen ters in Väster botten were giv en a fixed bud get, the number of pre scrip tions of phar ma ceu ti cal prod ucts de clined rel a tive ly to the con trol group (. Ta ble 2). This may be seen as indi cat ing that the pre scrib ing physi cians adapt ed to the new bud getary rules by becom ing more re luc tant to mak ing a prescrip tion than were con trols. Oth er possi ble ex pla na tions for this re sult in clude chang es in the health sta tus of the pop ula tion us ing these two health cen ters and de mo graph ic fac tors in the com mu ni ty where the health cen ters are lo cat ed. Howev er, the short pe ri od un der study makes such ex pla na tions less prob a ble since health sta tus and de mo graph ic fac tors are in most cas es rel a tive ly con stant over short pe ri ods of time.
The re sults also show that there were no sys tem at ic dif fer ences re gard ing ei ther price or quan ti ty per pre scrip tion be tween health cen ters us ing fixed and open-ended bud gets for phar ma ceu ti cal prod ucts, af ter con trol ling for sev er al con found ing fac tors. One pos si ble ex pla na tion is that the pre scrib ing physi cians did not be lieve the fixed bud gets to be cred i ble, in the sense that they ex pect ed the coun ty coun cil to cov er deficits or to cut fu ture bud gets in the case of sur plus. Oth er pos si ble ex pla nations are that the new in cen tive struc ture was not clear to the pre scrib ing physi cians, and that physi cians be lieved that any surplus gen er at ed could be used in ways that they dis liked.
The pres ent re sults dif fer from those report ed by Wheynes et al. [12] . Us ing data from one health au thor i ty in the United King dom, they found sup port for the hy poth e sis that fixed bud gets re duce pharma ceu ti cal costs. How ev er, their re sults are not di rect ly com pa ra ble to ours since they per formed their anal y ses on a single cross-sec tion al dataset, which lim it ed the pos si bil i ty of dis tin guish ing be tween se lec tion and treat ment ef fects. In fact, a po ten tial prob lem in both their study and ours is that in tro duc ing the new budgetary sys tem with fixed bud gets was volun tary for the re spec tive en ti ties. As such, the en ti ties which chose fixed phar ma ceuti cals bud gets might be the ones with low ini tial phar ma ceu ti cal ex pen di tures. In a cross-sec tion al anal y sis it is hard to sepa rate this se lec tion ef fect from the treatment ef fect, po ten tial ly lead ing to an overes ti ma tion of the lat ter. In our case the selec tion prob lem does not cause bias in the es ti mat ed treat ment ef fect on the treat ed since we con trolled for ini tial costs. Howev er, it re duces the gen er al iz abil i ty of results to health cen ters that did not opt for fixed bud gets since these might have had high er phar ma ceu ti cal costs, which could fa cil i tate cost re duc tions. In ad di tion, both of the health cen ters with fixed bud gets are lo cat ed in Skelleft eå, a re gion where sev er al oth er cost con tainment mea sures have been used, such as recom mend ed lists. Such lists of ten in clude not only which phar ma ceu ti cal prod uct to use but also rec om men da tions re gard ing the op ti mal pack age size to pre scribe to avoid over pre scrip tion. This could mean that de creas ing the phar ma ceu ti cal costs per pre scrip tion fur ther, for ex am ple, by in tro duc ing fixed bud gets, might be dif ficult. As such, the only way to re duce pharma ceu ti cal costs is to re tain the num ber of pre scrip tions made, as ob served in the two health cen ters which were giv en fixed bud gets. There fore it would be in ter est ing to study the ef fect of fixed phar ma ceu ti cal bud gets also in re gions where less ef fort has been de vot ed to con tain cost pri or to the in tro duc tion of fixed bud gets.
Cor re spond ing au thor Da vid Granlund
De part ment of Eco nomics, Umeå Uni ver si ty, Swe den e-mail: da vid.granlund@econ.umu.se
Ac knowl edge ments
We are grate ful for com ments by par tic i pants at the Third In ter na tion al Con fer ence on Health Economics, Man age ment and Pol i cy in Athens and by par tic i pants at a sem i nar at Umeå Uni ver si ty. We also thank Väster bot ten Coun ty Coun cil for pro vid ing the data and sub stan tial help ful in forma tion.
Con flict of in ter est: No in for ma tion sup plied
Ap pen dix: bal anc ing tests
To guar an tee that propen si ty score matching elim i nates all the bias for which the ob serv ables can ac count, the ob serv ables must be in de pen dent of the treat ment assign ment con di tioned on the propen si ty score. Sev er al dif fer ent tests of this con dition have been pro posed in the lit er a ture. These have dif fer ing lim i ta tions, and lit tle is known about their sta tis tic prop er ties. Our anal y sis em ployed two bal anc ing tests. The first was a Hotelling T 2 test of the joint null hy poth e sis of equal means be tween treat ment and con trol groups. This test can, how ev er, fail to re ject the null hy poth e sis even if X is de pen dent on treat ment as sign ment, con di tioned on the propen si ty score. One ex am ple of this is the case of some vari ables hav ing high er val ues in the treat ed group than in the matched group, for high val ues of the propen si ty score but low er val ues for low val ues of the propen si ty score. The sec ond bal anc ing test we con duct is a re gres sion based test de scribed by Smith and Todd (un pub lished). For each vari able used in es ti mat ing the propen si ty score we es timate the fol low ing re gres sion:
where D is an in di ca tor vari able which takes the val ue one if the ob ser va tion is treat ed. To test whether D pro vides ad dition al in for ma tion about X con di tioned on P(X) we test ed the joint null hy poth e sis that all the co ef fi cients of the terms in volving D equal 0. A short com ing to this test is that the choice of the or der of the polyno mi al may af fect the re sult. The re sults of the tests ap pear in . Ta ble 6. The Hotelling test re jects bal ance for three of the sub sam ples for Moröbacke. The re sults from the re gres sion based test show that be tween 10 and 33 of the in de pen dent vari ables re main un bal anced con di tioned on the propen si ty score, in all mod els.
